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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the practices that support an important risk management strategy in 
many organizations—analyzing and learning from past incidents of operational error 
and  failure.  Risk  management  has  become  an  increasingly  important  managerial 
function, and a range of prescriptive standards and guidelines for risk management have 
been produced. The situated work practices that underlie risk management in complex 
organizations have, however, received little empirical attention. To address this gap, this 
paper presents a qualitative, inductive study of the operation of Incident Reporting and 
Investigation Systems (IRIS) in airlines. This research aimed to characterize and map 
the assumptions, beliefs, strategies and tactics that determine risk management practice 
in this setting. Practices of risk identification, risk assessment and risk resolution were 
examined and characterized through three innovative concepts: interpretive vigilance, 
organizational risk resilience and participative networks. Characterizing practice in this 
way allows a range of theoretical and practical implications to be developed concerning 
the place of organizational knowledge, control and culture in risk management. 
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Introduction 
 
Incident reporting systems are used extensively in safety-critical industries such as 
commercial aviation and chemical processing to learn from near-miss events 
(Phimister et al., 2003). In these industries operational breakdowns can have 
catastrophic and far-reaching consequences. Personnel are encouraged to report 
minor failures or mishaps so that any underlying risks can be identified and 
responded to before they contribute to a serious accident (van der Schaaf, Lucas and 
Hale, 1991; Reason, 1997). Incident reporting systems are now being developed in a 
range of other risk management domains such as healthcare (Barach and Small, 
2000) and banking (Muermann and Oktem, 2002). As such, understanding how near-
miss incidents are actually used in risk management is both a pressing practical and 
theoretical problem.  
 
This paper examines the practical work of investigators who manage incident 
reporting systems. It specifically focuses on risk management in commercial 
aviation, analyzing the work of airline safety investigators who manage flight safety 
incident reporting systems. The primary objective here is to characterize the beliefs, 
assumptions and tactics that support the analysis of near-miss incident reports in this 
setting. The paper draws on in-depth qualitative, ethnographic data on the routine 
work practices of airline investigators in order to conceptualize the core components 
of these risk management practices.  
 
The paper presents three important findings. First, risk assessment predominantly 
involved assessments of the current organizational capacity to rebuff and respond to 
errors, rather than predictions of the possible future consequences of those errors. 
Second, risk identification involved actively searching out minor uncertainties and 
ambiguities in both current models of an organization’s operations, and those 
operations themselves. Third, risks were resolved by creating temporary networks of 
operational specialists and experts, who could be widely distributed around the 
organization, to participate in the investigation and review of risks.   
 
 
Airline incident reporting and investigation systems  
 
Incident Reporting and Investigation Systems (IRIS) lie at the heart of many airlines’ 
risk management efforts. These systems provide infrastructures that support 
analyzing and learning from past events: minor errors, failures and disruptions 
(Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000). They also support the core tasks of risk management.  
IRIS are functionally rather simple. In airlines they are operated by safety 
investigators based in an internal safety oversight unit. These units have no executive 
authority, and are charged solely with monitoring and reporting on safety 
performance within the airline. Front-line personnel, such as engineers and pilots, are 
required to report any operational error or mishap they encounter that may have 
safety implications. These paper-based reports are entered into a dedicated 
management information system, and then reviewed and assessed by the 
investigators.  
 
Investigators are responsible for identifying whether an incident represents a serious 
risk to flight safety, and for determining what the appropriate company response 
ought to be. This risk analysis process is predominantly based on professional 
judgement. Investigators typically have extensive experience to draw on, both of   3 
operational work and of safety management. Most have lengthy first-hand experience 
as engineers or flight crew, and as safety engineers or management pilots.  
Investigators can respond to any identified risk in a number of ways. Principally, 
investigators can request additional information regarding an event from the relevant 
specialist or manager. This may involve requesting an engineer check a piece of 
equipment, a manager debriefing members of crew, or a specialist reviewing a local 
procedure. Due to the limited information provided by the initial reports, any 
incident considered problematic has to be followed up in this way in order to make a 
fuller assessment.  
 
From these initial enquiries, complex and lengthy investigations can result. These 
can involve a range of people both within the organization and outside it, such as 
ground service contractors, air traffic service providers and equipment 
manufacturers. These may last from a few days to several months, and in a large 
airline several hundred can be ongoing at any one time.  
 
A second and equally important element of risk management practice in IRIS 
involves the communication of risks. Investigators report on safety events and 
distribute information on safety performance throughout the airline. Investigators 
prepare regular briefings to senior management that highlight recent significant 
incidents. They circulate regular newsletters to front-line personnel, reviewing 
noteworthy events, lessons learnt and action taken. And they have significant input 
into the safety agenda at board-level committee meetings, by preparing the focus and 
content of board papers for review. 
 
 
Challenges of risk management practice 
 
Current models of risk management vary widely, but all invariably focus on three 
core tasks: risk identification, risk assessment and risk resolution (e.g. IRM, 2002; 
Cabinet Office, 2002, COSO, 2004). These models specify that risks must first be 
identified by collecting and reviewing appropriate data. Then risks must be assessed 
to determine the level of threat they represent, typically in terms of the likelihood and 
severity of future consequences. Finally, risks must be resolved by evaluating each 
so that mitigating action can be prioritized on those that are least acceptable.  
 
The functional simplicity of IRIS can belie the complexity of the challenges faced by 
investigators in practice. These challenges are particularly pronounced regarding 
these three core tasks of risk management: identifying, assessing and resolving risks.  
 
First, identifying risks is hard. IRIS are awash with weak signs of potential risks. 
Investigators are presented with large numbers of incident reports—tens of thousands 
a year in large airlines. Any one of these may point to an important but previously 
unrecognized risk. Or they may not. Separating noise from signal is particularly 
challenging here.  
 
Second, assessing risk is challenging. By definition, IRIS collect information on only 
minor and relatively routine disruptions that resulted in little or no actual harm. And 
airlines are complex and heavily defended systems. Multiple safety barriers and risk 
controls exist at every step. Estimates of future adverse consequences are therefore 
highly uncertain and often extremely low. 
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Third, responding to risks is problematic. IRIS are typically operated from internal 
but independent safety oversight units. Investigators have no executive authority and 
cannot mandate or enforce action. Their role is only to monitor, investigate and 
report on safety. Further, in airlines as in other complex organizations, risks can span 
several departments and specialist areas. Understanding and addressing these risks 
often requires the coordinated action of diverse teams of personnel.  
 
This research therefore aimed to examine and explain the practical work that 
supports these three components of risk management in IRIS. It focused specifically 
on the practical assumptions, beliefs, models and tactics that underpinned risk 
management in airline flight safety incident reporting systems. 
 
 
Research methods 
 
A qualitative, grounded research approach was adopted to develop a theoretical 
account of risk management practice that both explained, and was well-grounded in, 
data on practice. 
 
 
Setting and participants 
 
The research was conducted in the safety oversight units of five airlines and two 
national air safety agencies. Data collection was primarily focused on the largest 
airline involved. A total of 26 investigators participated from these seven 
organizations, 10 in the main collaborating airline (Table 1). These organizations 
operated similar and well-established flight safety incident reporting programmes, 
though they differed in relative size and function. The airlines also differed in size. 
They included two large airlines, one medium-sized airline and two small airlines. 
The number of incident reports collected from pilots was broadly proportionate to 
their size (Table 1). The national air safety agencies collected reports from the entire 
national aviation industry, although these amounted to a similar quantity as the large 
airlines, as the agency’s reporting requirements encompassed only a proportion of 
each airline’s internally collected reports. 
 
 
Data collection 
 
Qualitative data on risk management practice was collected in three broad phases. 
This data collection was guided by the grounded theory principles of theoretical 
sampling (Glaser and Straus, 1967; Locke, 2001; Pidgeon and Henwood, 2003). The 
focus of data collection progressively shifted to examine practical issues and settings 
that provided the best opportunities to develop the emerging findings.  
 
The first phase involved a range of interviews with investigators in the main 
collaborating airline (Table 2). It began with a set of unstructured familiarization 
interviews. These were followed by a set of semi-structured interviews that explored 
processes of expert decision-making by having investigators verbalize their 
assessments of ten typical incident reports. 
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Table 1. Summary of key participants and level of incident reporting across all 
participating organizations. 
 
Organization      Participating 
investigators 
Incidents handled 
per year (approx) 
Principal collaborating airline  10  8,000 
Other collaborating organizations     
  Small franchise airline – A    1  200 
  Small franchise airline – B  1  500 
  Medium subsidiary airline   1  2,000 
  Large international airline  5  8,000 
  National regulatory agency  3  8,000 
  National safety agency  5  7,000 
  Total  16  _ 
Total  26  _ 
 
This phase was concluded by a set of semi-structured interviews that further explored 
the emerging themes by asking investigators to comment on a report summarizing 
the findings to date, and further focusing on the nature of investigators’ knowledge in 
risk management practice.  
 
The second data collection phase involved three months of participant-observation 
(Lee, 1999; Robson, 2002) in the main collaborating airline. The daily risk 
management activities of investigators were studied through some 400 hours of 
observation. I sat with and questioned investigators as they assessed incident reports 
and observed a range of routine conversations and formal and informal meetings and 
tasks (Table 3). Ethnographic fieldnotes were taken by hand (Emerson, Fretz and 
Shaw, 1995) and later typed up, detailing the practices and discussions I observed. 
 
Table 2. Summary of interview data sources. 
 
Interview  Number of interviews 
Unstructured familiarization    5 
Critical incident protocol    7 
Developmental thematic review    9 
Semi-structured comparative     
  Small franchise airline – A      1 
  Small franchise airline – B    1 
  Medium subsidiary airline     1 
  Large international airline    5 
  National regulatory agency    3 
  National safety agency    5 
Conversational group review     2 (5, 3)
a 
Total    39 
a Numbers in brackets denote the number of participants in each group review interview.  
 
The third phase of data collection began with semi-structured interviews at the 
additional six organizations (Table 2). These were selected on the basis of the 
similarity of their risk management systems, and their difference in terms of size and 
function. This allowed comparisons and contrasts to be drawn with the data already 
collected at the main collaborating airline. A final set of group review interviews 
were conducted at the main collaborating airline to get feedback on and develop the 
late-stage findings.   6 
Table 3. Summary of key participant observation data sources. 
 
Aspect of participant observation          Number 
Weeks in the field    10 
Incident reports talked-through    464 
Weekly briefs discussed    20 
Meetings observed     
  Flight safety team meetings    5 
  Flight safety board meeting    1 
  Company operations review meeting    1 
  Franchise airline safety board meeting    1 
  Total    8 
 
 
Data analysis 
 
Data analysis followed the grounded theory principles of constant comparison 
(Glaser and Straus, 1967; Turner, 1983; Locke, 2001) and was ongoing throughout 
the research. The aim was to move from specific data instances and examples of 
practice to more general theoretical concepts and relationships. Interview and 
fieldnote data was transcribed. Then, all instances relevant to understanding risk 
management practice were labelled. These labels aimed to describe, in clear terms, 
that small aspect of risk management practice. Data analysis cycled from this initial 
and low-level coding to phases of higher-level integration, comparison and revision. 
Low level codes were synthesized into higher-level categories. These categories were 
gradually defined and related to one another, producing a conceptual account of the 
risk management practices observed. Iterative phases of low-level labelling and 
higher-level integration were conducted throughout the research until a coherent 
account of risk management practice was produced that fully captured and explained 
all relevant data instances. Where these data instances are presented throughout this 
paper, they are referenced according to the phase of data collection and the 
participant being quoted (e.g. Phase 2- Investigator 3). 
 
 
Findings and discussion: Practices of managing organizational risk 
 
The practices associated with risk identification, assessment and resolution in IRIS 
are characterized and explained here in terms of three core concepts: resilience, 
vigilance and participation (Table 4). These concepts aim to capture how risk 
management was conducted in practice. They characterize the assumptions, beliefs 
and tactics that risk management was based on in IRIS. 
 
Table 4. Core concepts and their relation to practice.  
 
Core concept    Aspect of practice   
Organizational risk resilience    Framework for assessing risk and safety  
Interpretive vigilance    Ways of identifying and interpreting risks 
Participative networks    Means of addressing and acting on risks 
 
This theoretical account of risk management practice provides an initial structure 
through which to examine and understand what is a relatively new empirical arena. 
As an exploratory, inductive analysis of practice, each of these concepts is   7 
purposefully broad. They each draw on a broad heritage in the risk and safety 
management literature.  
 
Ideas of resilience have long been associated with risk management (Wildavsky, 
1988; Hood and Jones, 1996). Resilience typically refers to qualities of flexibility 
and adaptability in the face of surprising events: resilience allows individuals, 
organizations and societies to respond to, cope with and learn from adverse events 
(Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003). Vigilance is a concept strongly linked to ideas of 
attention, alertness and error. It features in accounts of the attentive monitoring of 
failures that is found in highly-reliable organizations (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 
1999). Its absence has been used in explanations of human error (Reason, 1990) and 
organizational disaster (Freudenburg, 1992). The participation of workers in safety 
management and risk regulation has become an increasingly salient feature of risk 
management programmes (Hutter, 2001; Wright and Lyons, 2001). Equally, new 
models of organizational learning emphasize the importance of participative, 
interactive processes in the production and use of knowledge (Lave and Wenger, 
1991).  
 
The concepts of resilience, vigilance and participation are therefore developed here 
as lenses onto a range of interconnected features and characteristics of organizational 
risk management. As such, they provide the basis for drawing on and developing a 
wide range of organizational theories in order to better understand risk management 
practice. Each concept is elaborated, detailing and explaining risk management 
practice in flight safety IRIS. The key theoretical implications of each are also 
examined.   
 
 
Framework of risk assessment: organizational risk resilience 
 
Assessments of risk were guided by a set of practical assumptions, principles and 
beliefs concerning the nature of organizational safety. Taken together, these 
constituted a working theory, or theory in practice, of risk. This framed the aspects of 
reported events that investigators attended to, and it determined how they interpreted 
and made sense of these incidents. This interpretive framework had two core 
components. First, risk and safety were interpreted in organizational terms, as 
properties emerging from organizational activities and processes—rather than in 
terms of consequences and outcomes as is the case in typical methods of risk 
assessment. Second, safety was viewed not simply as the absence of error and 
failure, nor as merely the ability to catch and contain mishaps. Safety was conceived 
of as the capacity to defend against the potential for minor mishaps developing 
further and escalating into more serious breakdowns. Attention focused on the 
adequacy of those organizational defences and controls that remained in reserve and 
unused in any situation—those that provided resilience to the risk of an event 
escalating. This view of safety can therefore be characterized as organizational risk 
resilience. Risk assessment in IRIS was used to determine where this capacity for 
resilience was eroded.  
 
The core assumption that formed the foundation of risk assessment in IRIS was that 
the potential for catastrophic consequences always existed in operations. Human 
error and technical failure were considered inevitable and entirely normal features of 
organizational activity: all aspects of operations were “fallible and frangible” (Phase 
1-Participant 5). IRIS collected reports of these operational failures every day.   8 
Significantly, there was a pervasive and fundamental belief that major accidents 
could result from a unique combination of these otherwise routine and minor failures. 
One investigator explained this with reference to another airline’s recent accident: 
The classic one is… the causes of the Paris Concorde accident. And it’s 
fascinating, the number of factors that led to that accident, fascinating. And 
any one of them would have stopped that accident, and yet they happen every 
single day—every one of them. (Phase 3-Investigator 5: P3-5).  
 
The accident referred to here, the fatal Concorde accident of 25th July 2000, resulted 
from the aircraft running over a small strip of metal left on the runway during take-
off. This burst a tyre on the left landing gear. Debris from the tyre damaged the 
underside of the wing and ruptured a fuel tank. Fire broke out as fuel streamed from 
the wing. The crew shut down engine number two on the fire warning. Engine one 
soon lost power—both affected by the fire engulfing the left wing—and the aircraft 
could not gain height. The right engines lost thrust seconds later and, unflyable, the 
aircraft crashed into a hotel.  
 
The assumption derived from this accident, and every other, was that any minor 
event had the potential, however remote, to develop into a serious, unforeseen and 
catastrophic accident. As such, assessing risk on the basis of absolute ‘worst case’ 
potential outcomes, as many guidelines recommend, was considered impractical as 
“every incident would be a catastrophe” (P3-12). Instead, risk assessment in IRIS 
was directed at assessing the underlying organizational capacity to prevent minor 
mishaps escalating into major breakdowns. Simply put, when assessing incidents 
investigators were literally interested in: 
What are the things that stop this being a catastrophe? (P1-2). 
Investigators were concerned with how resilient operations were—how effective risk 
controls and safety defences were at correcting or containing small failures. What 
was of primary importance in these assessments was not simply how well an error or 
failure had been caught by controls, but what defensive capacity remained beyond 
those, in case the event had developed further.  
 
A key principle underlying risk assessment here was that numerous diverse defences 
should remain in any situation, protecting operations against the potential for an 
event to escalate further. That is, operational safety required not simply resilience to 
failure, but resilience to risk. One example that highlights this approach was a 
hypothetical ‘worst case’ scenario in which a flight crew receive a warning from the 
Ground Proximity Warning System to urgently pull up away from terrain: 
The GPWS is the classic really, that’s a worst-case, if you get a real one 
you’ve lost it really, it’s one circuit breaker left to protect you. You are down 
to tight stuff. (P1-1). 
 
While a safety system might do as it was designed to and catch the problem, 
situations such as these were nonetheless considered “as bad as it gets” (P2-1). With 
no further defences remaining, a failure here would leave operations entirely 
unprotected and exposed to potential catastrophe.  
 
In light of this, incidents were used to assess the underlying organizational capacity 
for safety—characterized here as risk resilience—rather than to assess the actual 
adverse impact of an incident or to predict its potential future consequences.  
 
Assessments of the quality of organizational safety fell along a broad spectrum. They 
tended to fall into three key distinguishable groups. First, where defensive processes   9 
were deemed adequate and currently acceptable—for the time being. This broadly 
represented a ‘normal’ and unproblematic state, and a close approximation to relative 
‘safety’. Second, where risk resilience was considered to be reduced, and existed in a 
somewhat deteriorated state. This was where defensive processes were considered 
less robust or extensive than they could be, or were functioning below par. 
Operations remain protected, but in a less than optimal condition. Third, where risk 
resilience was entirely degraded, deficient or absent. Here, a state was deemed to 
exist where defences were deficient, providing few or only weak protections against 
minor failures escalating into major ones. 
 
Assessments of risk drew together a range of subtle judgements that investigators 
made regarding the efficacy and adequacy of safety defences and risk controls. These 
judgements primarily focused on the organizational nature of defences. Safety 
defences or risk controls were viewed as properties of practical work routines that 
provided capabilities to deal with failure. Work routines involved the interaction of 
social and technical elements: people operating, managing and maintaining 
technologies. That is, defences and controls were not viewed as simple mechanisms, 
or purely technical objects, but as organizational processes that hinged on the 
cognizance and competence of personnel in relation to technical systems.  
 
One investigator’s discussion of the onboard warning system ‘TCAS’ (Traffic Alert 
and Collision Avoidance System), which alerts pilots to aircraft on a course 
conflicting with their own, indicates the inherently social nature of even this 
apparently automated, technical ‘defence’: 
You want to see the crew saying, we are likely to get a [traffic] warning out 
of this, and you want ATC [Air Traffic Control] to pick it up too. So that is a 
system getting close to the edge but the monitoring is good, so when the RA 
[traffic warning] does go off, the crew is ready for it. So that’s a system that 
even though a defence operated, it didn’t operate as the final, ‘holy shit what 
was that?’ So that is what counts, multiple systems and the crew at least 
having some knowledge of what is going on. (P1-1). 
Investigators didn’t draw a neat line between technical and human aspects of the 
organization. When assessing risk, both were seen as complementary and 
inextricably intertwined. Defensive capabilities were analyzed as interactions 
between social and technical aspects of practical work—even though, for practical 
ease, a ‘defence’ was typically referred to as a single and static ‘thing’.  
 
Investigators’ understandings of the Ground Proximity Warning System, or ‘GPWS’, 
which automatically warns flight crew of terrain hazards equally demonstrates this 
point. Investigators often referred to the GPWS as simply ‘a defence’. But what they 
were referring to, as revealed by their detailed discussions and in their practical 
examination of GPWS incidents, was actually an inherently sociotechnical process, 
rather than a single mechanism that is either in place and working or not. 
Investigators believed that, on its own, the warning system itself only provides a 
warning. Flight crews have to act on that warning appropriately and competently for 
it to do any good. For that to happen, appropriate training is required and suitable 
procedures for responding to these warnings must be developed, implemented and 
monitored; So investigators understood each ‘defence’ as an admixture of social and 
technical processes that extended throughout the organization, and that worked in 
interaction. What was labeled a ‘safety defence’ or ‘risk control’ was, in practice, 
less static and determinate than may typically be assumed.  
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In assessing the effectiveness and quality of defensive processes, six attributes of 
organizational processes were routinely attended to (Table 5). These organizational 
attributes were core properties of risk resilience, and perceived deficiencies in these 
attributes were interpreted as signs of degrading risk resilience. 
 
Table 5. Properties of organizational processes attended to in risk assessment. 
 
Characteristics of organizational resilience and illustrative examples 
Ability – the provision of appropriate competence, knowledge, skills, conditions, tools and 
equipment.  
  Example 1. A flight crew improperly used a new automated system. 
A crew reported that while preparing for take-off they used a newly introduced automated system to 
calculate the airspeed, but then erroneously reverted to the old routine of setting flaps to ‘15’ out of habit. 
Investigators were concerned that the introduction of this new system had created a performance trap 
(“this is a trap that they’ve obviously fallen into… they let experience override it,” P4-6) that challenged 
crews’ ability to perform this task effectively.  
Awareness – the maintenance of requisite understanding, cognizance, comprehension, 
models, information and data. 
  Example 2. Engineers initially missed the cause of an electrical fault. 
Passengers reported an electrical smell that dissipated once the In-Flight Entertainment (IFE) equipment 
was isolated. Engineers concluded debris around the wires was to blame, cleared it and reinstated the IFE 
for the return flight. More detailed investigation later revealed that screws had been driven through the 
wiring. “They convinced themselves into thinking it was just the debris, so it wasn’t investigated properly 
down route... Then later they found the real problem” (P4-6). These fault finding processes had failed in 
terms of awareness.  
Communication – the passing of timely and appropriate information supporting mutual 
comprehension and co-ordinated activity. 
  Example 3. Flight crew did not communicate effectively during a go-around.  
An incident where a go-around was inadvertently initiated and then poorly flown, elaborated in Example 
10 (Table 6), largely implicated poor communication between the flight crew. The crew were slow to 
share their understanding of the situation with each other, “the problem was they had two different mental 
models of what they were doing” (P4-6), and so literally “they weren’t working together as a crew” (P4-
3). Communication and coordination had broken down.  
Verification – the means to check, substantiate, observe, monitor, record and confirm. 
  Example 4. Take-off was initiated at too low an airspeed.   
Aircraft rotation (pulling the nose up off the runway) was attempted before the necessary air speed had 
been reached, due to a misplaced ‘speed bug’ marking the take-off reference speed on the air speed 
indicator. The missed bug hadn’t been caught by the other pilot as they were awkward to check: “It’s hard 
to cross-check from the right hand seat due to the angle of the dials” (P4-4). This reduced the efficacy of 
cross-check practices on this aircraft type.  
Specification – the creation, use and suitability of procedures, plans, controls, customs, 
policy and conventions. 
  Example 5. Loose bolts caused a spurious engine fire warning.  
Some bolts were not tightened at the end of a maintenance job. The initial stage of the job was performed 
by a new engineer as laid out in the manual, loosening all bolts, but the local convention was only to 
remove a few that were necessary for access. The engineer who completed the job then only refitted the 
bolts typical for local practice. Work practices were not properly specified. “The problem… is that if it 
says all those things on the card then they should do them all. So the customs should be reviewed and 
woven into the [manual]” (P4-5). 
Margin – the maintenance of redundancies, reserves, alternates, excesses and buffers 
beyond the minimum required 
  Example 6. Flight crew landed with less than the required reserve fuel left.  
A crew used some of their emergency reserve fuel while waiting for a snow storm to pass before landing. 
“They had forty minutes of hold fuel… the hold turned out to be forty two minutes, then a heavy snow 
storm came out of nowhere—well they just don’t come out of the blue! …that’s poor management and 
planning, it’s all going to plan but they’re not looking far enough ahead” (P4-1). This indicated that 
appropriate reserves and margins were not being preserved.  
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Implications: Resilience, defences and organizational control 
 
At core, practices of risk assessment in IRIS involved assessing the quality and 
extent of organizational control. Importantly, risk was not routinely assessed by 
attempting to predict the possible future consequences of specific incidents, as 
models of risk management typically specify (e.g. IRM, 2002). Instead, risk 
assessment was more of a diagnostic activity. It involved diagnosing where 
organizational processes did not provide adequate protection against failures, and 
then assessing the severity of this degradation.  
 
These findings are in line with a range of research that increasingly focuses on 
understanding resilience in organizations that operate in unforgiving environments 
(e.g. Reason, 1997; Pidgeon, 1998; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999;). The 
concept of resilience has attracted attention in terms of  the ways organizations can 
respond to and recover from unexpected disruptions (Hollnagel, Woods and 
Leveson, 2006; Sheffi, 2005). 
 
At core, resilience has previously been conceived of as the ability to “bounce back” 
(Wildavsky, 1988, p. 77; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 14) and learn from errors and 
failures as they occur. That is, resilience has traditionally been a concept premised on 
reacting in hindsight to failures and challenges once they are underway (Sutcliffe and 
Vogus, 2003). This strategy of resilience is typically held in opposition to that of 
anticipation, or foresight, which aims to predict and then put in place protective 
measures to guard against future threats—the premise that underpins modern risk 
management systems.  
 
In practice here, however, ideas of resilience were heavily integrated with notions of 
risk. Here organizational safety was construed not only as this ability to ‘bounce 
back’ from actual events as they occurred. Assessments of safety went beyond this. 
Investigators assessed operational incidents in terms of the quality of the immediate 
organizational response to the event, but also crucially in terms of the residual, 
remaining systems that could have caught the event if it had progressed further, and 
the initial responses had failed. Safety was premised on the widespread assumption 
of the need for ‘defences in depth’ (Reason, 1990). That is, in any situation, 
investigators assessed the quality of the remaining defences or latent controls that 
were not called upon in the event, but nonetheless provided additional means to 
catch, control or correct errors if they had developed that far—such as multiple back-
up systems, additional cross-checks of data or automated alarm systems. In normal 
operations, these systems are rarely used to ‘catch’ or ‘bounce back’ from an error. 
But they are nonetheless routinely maintained, monitored or performed to provide 
this capacity for resilience in case they might be needed. It was these ‘reserve 
defences’ that were the primary focus of investigators’ assessments. And safety was 
considered acceptable only when the potential for an error developing further or 
getting worse was adequately defended against by these reserve systems—in short, 
where there was resilience to risk in operations.  
 
This study of risk management practice provides a partial sketch of how concepts of 
risk and resilience may be integrated. It also implies that research on organizational 
resilience should more closely examine the question ‘resilience to what?’—actual 
errors and events, possible failures and mishaps, or the risk of minor incidents 
escalating into catastrophe? Current research largely leaves this question open.   12 
One of the most notable developments of existing theory from this study of practice 
centres on the ideas of safety defences, barriers and risk controls (Hollnagel, 2004; 
Reason, 1997; Svenson, 1991). Studying practice suggests that the way safety 
defences, risk controls—and operational hazards—are currently defined may be 
somewhat problematic.  
 
In most accounts it is assumed that defences are some form of barrier designed to 
keep ‘bad’ things ‘out’. Like the concentric fortifications of a castle, safety barriers 
stop hazards—fire say, or explosions—coming into contact with valuable and fragile 
assets, such as people or property (Reason, 1997). These are the assumptions that 
‘barrier’ theories of safety (Hollnagel, 2004; Svenson, 1991), as well as basic models 
of risk management, are based on. Accidents happen when hazards penetrate system 
defences and cause damage. But in practice, defences were not viewed as a barrier 
that separates an asset from a hazard. In fact, the traditional notion of ‘hazard’ barely 
featured. Threats were viewed instead as the possibility of organizational processes 
breaking down, and as weaknesses in the capability for effective control. That is, 
defences were conceived of as keeping organizational activity within safe, known 
and manageable confines. Defences didn’t stop a hazard getting ‘in’. They stopped 
operations getting ‘out’—out of control and out of the normal, safe range of activity 
(e.g. Reason and Hobbs, 2003). The risk was organizational processes themselves 
becoming unwieldy or fragile. This represents a subtle but important shift in 
emphasis regarding the nature of safety defences and risk controls, in that they may 
be better defined in theory and assessed in practice in terms of the degree to which 
they constitute and control effective organizational processes. 
 
 
Identifying risks: interpretive vigilance 
 
Risk identification concerns how risks come to be noticed and initially known about 
in organizations. Practices of risk identification in IRIS aimed to create a high degree 
of alertness and sensitivity to early, weak signs of previously unknown risks 
(Macrae, 2007). In light of their conception of risk, investigators specifically worked 
to actively seek out deficiencies in organizational safety: where there was little left to 
prevent errors potentially spiralling out of control. This approach to risk 
identification, and the associated analytical practices, can be characterized as 
interpretive vigilance. This encompassed two interrelated processes. First, 
investigators aimed to monitor and interpret incidents vigilantly for signs of potential 
operational problems. Second, they sought to remain vigilant to flaws in those 
interpretations and inadequacies in current knowledge of operations. As such, 
investigators strived for similar ideals of oversight as have been observed in other 
high-reliability organizations: where attention is focused on small operational 
deviations and disruptions (Rochlin, 1989), and where unexpected or surprising 
events become the locus for further enquiry and change (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). 
  
A distinct set of assumptions and beliefs underlay risk identification in IRIS. 
Investigators viewed their role of risk management and oversight as one of 
maintaining knowledge and awareness of all risks facing the organization. A core 
assumption—and aspiration—here was that signs of new emerging risks could and 
should be identified by piecing together cues in apparently inconsequential, minor, 
‘small’ events. Discovering that a problem had not been noticed or fully understood 
for some period of time was considered a serious failure, both of organizational 
safety and their own ability to monitor it:   13 
The ones that trouble you are the ones that come out of leftfield and you 
think, how did we get caught out like that? … You’ve not done your job by 
flagging this back earlier. (P1-1).  
A core belief amongst IRIS investigators was that their job was to identify risks 
‘early’ to avoid being ‘caught out’ and surprised by problems that had gone 
unnoticed for some time. Yet, while being caught out was considered an 
unacceptable failure on their part (“it means we have been derelict”, P1-8), it was 
also considered inevitable. Investigators frequently discussed their own experiences 
of missing and misinterpreting early signs of risks. Knowledge of risk was assumed 
to be always partial and incomplete. Dealing with a continuous stream of incident 
reports reinforced this assumption: 
We do our hazard identification and risk analysis and think we’ve cracked it. 
And then things happen: events. (P3-6). 
IRIS continually exposed investigators to information about unexpected and 
previously unrecognized organizational problems. Because of this, interpretations of 
risk were handled in IRIS with a degree of humility and caution. Risk assessments 
were seen as a product of current knowledge and understanding, and so continually 
open to change: “your judgement of risk is dependent on what’s happened in the 
past, it’s not a fixed entity” (P2-2). In IRIS it was widely acknowledged that at 
different times near-identical incidents could be interpreted in very different ways, 
“because your knowledge has moved—and hopefully expanded” (P2-3). 
 
This set of fundamental beliefs underpinned the risk identification strategy used in 
IRIS. This strategy largely involved monitoring for potential gaps or inconsistencies 
in current knowledge of operations. Investigators aimed to identify where their 
knowledge of organizational safety was in some way questionable or suspect, to 
focus further investigation there. While this strategy was relatively straightforward, 
putting it into practice was not. In IRIS, identifying new or previously unrecognized 
risks was a task that, at the outset, was based on extremely limited data—often two 
or three events at most. Tracking trends of events was a useful indication of 
underlying problems. But, as investigators frequently noted when trying to identify 
risks in their early stages of development: 
…you can’t back it up with enough data. The bigger the trend the better, but 
the [IRIS] database won’t always tell you that, because it is three examples 
that lead you to a conclusion. (P3-5). 
Risk identification was therefore largely an interpretive rather than a statistical 
exercise. Incident reports were used to actively interrogate and test current models 
and understandings of operations, to find where these appeared weak or out of date.  
 
Four distinct interpretive tactics were used in IRIS to make sense of incidents and 
determine where operational safety—and knowledge of it—may be weaker than 
previously believed (Table 6).  Connections were drawn between minor incidents 
and past major accidents or current concerns, indicating that operations were exposed 
to a previously unrecognized threat. Patterns were made between similar features in 
events, indicating that a common underlying problem might exist. Discrepancies 
were sought out in operational processes or in current models of them, indicating that 
these needed re-examining. And novel facets of failure were focused on, indicating 
that current knowledge was incomplete in some way.  
 
Through these interpretive tactics, the adequacy of operational safety and 
organizational knowledge were continually tested. IRIS provided a platform for 
identifying risks through the vigilant monitoring and interpretation of minor 
organizational mishaps.   14 
Table 6. Illustrations of the interpretive tactics used in risk identification. 
 
Interpretive tactics and illustrative examples 
Drawing connections 
  Example 7. An aircraft nearly used the full length of a runway to land.  
The crew reported that on an approach in heavy rain they failed to override the automatic reverse thrust 
due to unrelated confusion over the apparent failure of a windscreen wiper. This event was immediately 
deemed “a bit of a QF1” (P4-1), referring to the flight code of another airline’s aircraft that had overrun a 
runway and ended up in a field a few years previously. In that case, a water logged runway, poor crew 
communication and an inadequate braking technique were contributory factors. These factors were the 
basis of the connection drawn between that accident and this incident. This connection lead the 
investigator to suspect than a superficially inconsequential incident may point to an emerging and 
unrecognized problem in landing and approach discipline.  
Making patterns 
  Example 8. A series of events indicating improperly secured cargo. 
Over a couple months, investigators noticed several similar events involving pieces of cargo in the aircraft 
hold being found, on arrival, to be improperly fastened down, not fastened at all, or flight crew reporting 
hearing a ‘thump’ or ‘bump’ during flight. Unrestrained cargo can be a problem if it moves around and 
affects the trim and handling of the aircraft. Three events had been reported in the first month, and then it 
went up to about seven in the second month, and they had been seeing “bigger lumps of cargo” moving 
around (P4-4) into the bargain. Although the incidents themselves had little actual impact, investigators 
flagged this up as a “minor issue snowballing” (P4-4). These events presented a clear pattern, suggesting 
that something was amiss in the loading of cargo. On closer examination, investigators found that all the 
events could be traced back to the same terminal, reinforcing and localizing their suspicion of an 
underlying problem with work practices there.  
Sensing discrepancy 
  Example 9. An engine warning lead to a cancelled take-off.  
A report described how a take-off had been aborted at low speed due to an engine overspeed warning that 
signalled one of the compressor fans in the jet engine was spinning too fast, reducing thrust. The flight 
crew contacted the engineering control centre, were advised to check the engine with two stationary 
engine runs and, as they were clear, to depart as planned. Rejected take-offs are part of normal operations. 
But on this occasion the investigator “thought they would have done other checks before restarting” (P4-
3) with that particular type of warning and was not sure that the advice was appropriate on that occasion. 
Following this up the powerplant engineers confirmed that it was a ‘red’ EICAS (Engine Indicating and 
Crew Alerting System) warning that required additional precautionary maintenance checks before 
dispatch. This lead to the advisory performance and procedures of engineering control being called into 
question and subjected to further investigation.  
Perceiving novelty 
  Example 10. A switch misselection on approach was poorly responded to.  
A crew reported they had inadvertently hit the ‘Take-Off/Go-Around’ (TO/GA) switch—which applies 
full engine power—instead of the autothrottle disconnect switch during approaches to land. This error was 
well-known as the switches are located in opposite positions on one type of aircraft compared to all the 
others built by the same manufacturer. This had been extensively investigated and was viewed as “design-
induced pilot error” (P4-1) that could only be addressed through training when crew members moved to 
that aircraft type. However, in this event the crew were slow to realize what had happened, did not cancel 
the switch, and subsequently completed an awkward and clumsy go-around manoeuvre. This highlighted 
“a whole bunch of issues beyond TO/GA and the physical selection of the switch” (P4-6) such as crew 
communication, go-around training regimes in the flight simulators, and the effectiveness of crew 
briefings. This novel event overturned previously accepted beliefs in this area: “we thought selecting 
TO/GA was not in itself an unsafe action. This altered our view” (P4-6) 
 
 
Implications: Knowledge, ignorance and early warning signs 
 
Practices of risk identification in IRIS represent an approach to risk management that 
was based on a deep appreciation of the limits to knowledge, and that employed 
interpretive tactics that aimed to find gaps and inadequacies in current 
understandings of risk. Primarily, this indicates a core but relatively under-explored 
theoretical issue—that risk management is crucially concerned with acquiring and 
maintaining knowledge of the challenges and threats that face an organization. 
Managing risk is a process of developing and revizing current knowledge in the face 
of irreducible uncertainty (Wildavsky, 1988). Models of risk management typically 
specify the infrastructures of information collection and manipulation that can   15 
support this. But studying risk management practice highlights the intuitive, 
generative, creative—and often fallible—sociocognitive processes that seem 
essential to interpreting and making sense of ambiguous risk events in organizations.  
 
Identifying risks was largely an interpretive rather than statistical process. It involved 
piecing together the limited, ambiguous and fragile information available on 
incidents with broader frames of reference and bodies of knowledge (e.g. Weick, 
1995a; Cook and Brown, 1999). Viewing risk identification as an interpretive 
process in this way leads to several important insights.  
 
First, the available knowledge and frames of reference are as important as the 
information and data collected. While most effort is focused on the collection of 
relevant risk data, this may be only half of the story. Here, detailed knowledge of 
operational processes, organizational goals, previous problems and past accidents 
were of particular importance in identifying new risks. How such knowledge is used, 
shared and represented in risk management—often in the form of stories about past 
events (e.g. Orr, 1996; Weick, 1987)—is a critical issue that requires closer attention. 
Further, these findings reinforce the argument that these forms of detailed, practical 
knowledge may easily be lost in efforts to systematize and standardize risk 
management processes (Power, 2004).  
 
A second important implication is that ‘warning signs’ of organizational problems  
have to be actively constructed and created. They are not self-evident, to be merely 
noticed or missed by managers (cf. Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Sheaffer, Richardson 
and Rosenblatt, 1998). The processes involved in interpreting warning signs is 
central to understanding risk management practice in organizations (Vaughan, 1996; 
Turner, 1978). In practice here, warning signs were constructed by forming a 
tentative belief that current knowledge was in some way inadequate or incomplete. 
That is, risk management was an interpretive process of testing and identifying the 
limits of current knowledge. Incidents were used to interrogate the unknown 
(Wildavsky, 1988; Macrae, 2006), test assumptions (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997), 
challenge expectations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001) and so become aware of 
ignorance (Smithson, 1989).  
 
Practices of risk identification were organized around finding areas of organizational 
ignorance—where understandings of operational processes were poor, incomplete or 
confused. This broader consideration of ignorance and the limits of knowledge seems 
central to explaining risk management practice, in contrast to the narrow definition of 
uncertainty that is typically deployed in risk management models that focus 
exclusively on the probability of future adverse consequences. Further exploring the 
nature and purpose of different forms of ignorance (e.g. Smithson, 1989; Cunha, 
Clegg and Kamoche, 2006) in risk management practice would seem a valuable 
research endeavour. 
 
 
Resolving risks: participative networks 
 
IRIS supported a distributed and decentralized approach to acting on and resolving 
risks. As an oversight mechanism, IRIS did not provide direct authority to mandate 
or enforce action. Instead, the aspirations and practices of investigators in IRIS 
centred on managing awareness of risks within the organization, and creating 
ownership and accountability for resolving risks by relevant personnel. IRIS were   16 
used to create participative networks around risks. Investigators initiated, coordinated 
and monitored the participation of personnel from around the organization—and 
often outside it—in examining and resolving risks. Participation is a key goal in 
many systems of risk management (Hutter, 2001; Wright and Lyons, 2001), and in 
models of organizational learning (Lave and Wenger,  1991). Here, risks were 
addressed by guiding local specialists to review and investigate operational practices 
in their area. In this way, investigators supervised the local and decentralized 
investigation of risks, and acted as the coordinating hub of often widely dispersed 
investigative activity. By organizing local participation in risk management, 
investigators were able to shape the production of organizational knowledge, change 
local work practices, and orchestrate organization-wide learning in response to risks.  
 
A central belief of investigators was that the ultimate purpose of IRIS was to 
generate action and resolve risks. Incident reports were used to provoke and trigger 
deeper investigation of risks, to focus organizational resources on problems and, 
essentially, to effect organizational change. Assessments of risk were used to drive 
action and get things done, as investigators commonly explained:  
The purpose you do [risk assessment] is… because you want to understand 
the appropriate corporate response. It helps you focus your resources on the 
appropriate areas to bring about the change that will hopefully get rid of that 
problem. (P1-7). 
While organizational action was the aim, IRIS provided no direct control or authority 
over this action. In IRIS, creating organizational action was about influencing and 
guiding the action of others. In practice, investigators worked to achieve this in two 
ways. First, they publicized signs of potential risks within the organization. 
Directors, managers, supervisors and operational specialists were informed of 
significant incidents by the distribution of regular—typically weekly—briefings. 
These were intended to make sure that people who should know about serious 
incidents, did.  
It means it gets to people. With the best will in the world, the director 
wouldn’t have time to go in to [the IRIS database] to search himself, and so 
someone would be doing it for him. So if they aren’t telling him the good 
stuff, then we are. (P2-1).  
Second, investigators posed questions about the adequacy of organizational 
processes, by requesting reviews and further information from operational 
specialists, and by producing regular papers for review at board level.  
 
In posing questions and publicizing incidents, investigators aimed to direct attention 
and manage awareness of risks within the organization. The aim was straightforward: 
to “flag it up, and say these are the things you should be looking at today” (P3-1). 
Through the IRIS, investigators were setting and continually revizing a risk 
agenda—what people should be aware of and attending to. Equally, investigators 
aimed to provoke enquiry and action—to make risks visible to those responsible for 
resolving them:   
[We] don’t take the decisions, we invite the departments to—to take 
ownership of safety… It is making them accountable, and it is their decision. 
(P3-6). 
 
By creating awareness of current risks within the organization—and an audit trail—
IRIS were used to make the ownership of risks visible, as much as the risks 
themselves. Investigators aimed to ensure widespread participation in risk 
management. By distributing signs and questions regarding risks, IRIS were used to 
engage networks of diverse specialists and personnel in the investigation and   17 
management of risks. Investigators contacted personnel who were relevant to 
resolving a risk, often bringing together a range of people from different operational 
areas, forming a temporary and distributed team. Incident reports provided a focus 
around which reflection and action was organized.  
 
The extent of intervention required by investigators in resolving a risk was 
determined according to three criteria. These criteria were used to evaluate how 
worthwhile and beneficial it would be to act on a risk—in simple terms, the risk 
management value of action. Judgements of the value of acting on a risk considered 
three issues. First, the potential safety benefits that would accrue, in terms of 
strengthened resilience and greater knowledge. Second, the extent to which current 
organizational activity was already addressing the risk. And third, the practicality of 
actually addressing the risk and achieving material improvements (Table 7). These 
criteria were the basis on which the level of appropriate action was evaluated in IRIS. 
 
Table 7. Practical criteria for evaluating the worth of risk management 
intervention. 
 
Criteria for evaluating action and illustrative examples 
Potential learning – the extent to which safety may be improved by acting, in terms of 
strengthened risk resilience and increased organizational knowledge. 
  Example 11. Unknown chemical powder spilt in the cargo hold.  
When the chemical was found, “they tested it for anthrax and everything, but did it damage the aeroplane? 
…we’re concerned about the effect on flight safety—and that no one else seems to have worried about 
that” (P4-4). This was identified as a simple and direct opportunity to act to both specifically highlight the 
safety issues surrounding potential corrosive substances and aluminium airframes, and more generally to 
increase awareness of safety issues and increase the focus on safety.  
Current activity – the extent to which current organizational activity is already addressing 
a risk, and how adequate and effective this action is 
  Example 12. A series of events with aircraft marshalled too close to a building. 
Marshallers as one airport repeatedly directed aircraft extremely close to a building, resulting on one 
occasion with an engine striking a concrete pillar. While initially it was believed that an adequate plan had 
been drawn up by their counterparts at the foreign station (“these guys are on top of it” (P4-4), when more 
events occurred several weeks later, it became clear that these actions were ineffective and it was 
worthwhile them intervening: “[The station managers] are saying, well we’ve done everything and briefed 
them—well they obviously haven’t as it still keeps happening!” (P4-5).  
Pragmatic practicality – the extent to which it is practically possible for the organization 
to address a risk and achieve material improvements in safety 
  Example 13. Flight crew seat moved on fastening rails during landing.  
A pilot reported that while landing, his seat lurched forward. This could dramatically interfere with a 
pilot’s control of the aircraft (“he practically ended up on top of the controls… This is potentially quite 
nasty,” P4-4). Engineers had investigated and found no defects or blockage, but that the seat rails 
appeared very slightly worn. These were replaced, and the issue referred to the airframe manufacturer. 
Investigators were waiting on a recommendation from them, so for the moment, further action on their 
part was considered unlikely to make any further contribution.  
 
 
Implications: Organizing culture, learning and expertise 
 
Risks were responded to in IRIS by initiating and shaping distributed processes of 
investigation and action, and the need for this action was evaluated in terms of what 
it might achieve. Primarily, these findings demonstrate that IRIS not only provided a 
mechanism to monitor and analyze organizational risks. They equally provided an 
important means by which organizational culture and practice was constituted and 
fashioned.  
 
In practice, incidents were actively used for organizational purposes. They were used 
as points around which diverse operational specialists were connected and brought   18 
together to manage risks. They facilitated communication about risks that otherwise 
may not have taken place. And they provided small, concrete cues that acted as focal 
points for line personnel, operational specialists and managers to reflect on, and 
enquire into, the adequacy of operational processes—and their assumptions about 
them. In a real sense, incident reports were used to direct and ground the ongoing 
reflection and learning that seems critical to maintaining effective and informed 
cultures of safety (Reason, 1997; Pidgeon and O’Leary, 1994). As such, IRIS 
directly address some of the most insidious organizational risks that allow the causes 
of disaster to incubate and remain latent (Turner, 1994; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997; 
Reason, 1997; Vaughan, 1996): erroneous beliefs and false assumptions. 
 
The analysis also points to how a small group of investigators can lead broader 
processes of organizational learning. Investigators chose many of the issues that were 
explored by operational specialists and they shaped the nature of the ensuing 
investigations. They linked their processes of interpreting incidents with the 
reflection and learning of personnel around the organization. In this sense, processes 
of risk management involved the bridging of individual and organizational learning 
(e.g. Holmqvist, 2003).  
 
Further, assessments of risk were inextricably tied up with judgements of how those 
risks could be acted on and resolved—and by whom. The practical interplay between 
processes of risk assessment and risk evaluation has received limited empirical 
scrutiny to date (Wilpert and Fahlbruch, 2002; Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock, 1990). 
Here, interpreting risk was heavily oriented to acting, and was structured by a set of 
criteria that evaluated the level of achievable action and the likely value of the 
results. While in many domains, risks have traditionally been evaluated in purely 
negative terms—stopping the unacceptable and preventing the intolerable—in 
practice here, risks were evaluated as sources of potential gains and valuable 
improvements to organizational processes. One important implication of this is how 
judgements of risk were used in practice as an interpretive tool. Risk assessments 
were constructs, constructed for the purpose of directing attention, focusing 
resources and getting action. Like Smith’s (1988, 1989) definition of managerial 
‘problems’, assessments of risk were applied in order to generate and direct 
organizational action (e.g. Power, 2003).   
 
Practically, these findings reaffirm the importance of social skills in risk 
management (e.g. Weick and Roberts, 1993; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999). 
For instance, the practical ability to frame and pose appropriate questions to initiate 
and shape the enquiry of others seems a key, if easily overlooked, skill. IRIS were 
used to create an organizational space in which this collective reflection and 
participative learning could legitimately unfold. Further examination of how 
participative engagement in risk management unfolds (Hutter, 2001), and how these 
social processes are supported, would seem a valuable area for future research. For 
instance, one important issue is the degree to which formal risk management systems 
can either support or undermine worker participation. This research echoes past work 
that suggests both the formal design and informal culture of safety oversight are 
crucial in this regard (Hopkins, 2005; Vaughan, 1990; Hutter, 2001). Participation in 
the investigation and management of risks requires issues of blame and trust to be 
sensitively negotiated. The fear of blame for risks can severely impact the nature and 
effectiveness of risk management (Power, 2007; Jeffcott, Pidgeon and Weyman, 
2006). Equally, participation in risk management requires work and therefore   19 
encouragement. It likely depends on effectively communicating and rewarding the 
resulting improvements to organizational safety (Reason, 1997). 
 
 
Broader applicability and limitations 
 
Adopting an in-depth qualitative, inductive approach to examine risk management in 
IRIS allowed a detailed picture of practice to be developed, and a range of theoretical 
insights to be elaborated on. This research nonetheless has limitations, most notably 
regarding the potential applicability of these findings to other settings and domains.  
 
The theoretical account of practice developed here, in terms of three core concepts, 
represent tentative contributions towards the development of a more advanced 
theoretical understanding of this area (Weick, 1995b). Equally, it should be 
emphasized that practice was characterized through these three concepts to provide a 
degree of simplicity and clarity in capturing important facets and ideals of practice. 
No claims are made regarding whether such clarity or ideals have been—or perhaps 
ever can be—actually achieved in practice. These concepts were developed in order 
to provide theoretical insight, not as an assertion that the practitioners studied here in 
some way attained, for instance, a state of perfect and perpetual ‘interpretive 
vigilance’.  
 
In terms of applicability, the findings from this research are necessarily based on the 
examination of a relatively focused ‘sample’ of risk management practice—that 
within IRIS in a small number of aviation organizations. Research that focuses on 
depth and detail of understanding necessarily has to sacrifice breadth (Weick, 1979), 
and this research did not aim to address how widespread or generalizable these 
findings may be. There are, nonetheless, strong grounds for the wider applicability or 
‘transferability’ of the findings (King, 2000).  
 
First, the structure of IRIS are reasonably standard across a wide range of domains 
(Reason, 1997; Barach and Small, 2000). It is reasonable to expect that the 
challenges faced and the work conducted within them are similar too. The findings 
may therefore provide useful explanations of these—though that, of course, is an 
empirical question.  
 
Second, by focusing on questions concerning the salient features of risk management 
practice, and the ways in which organizational events were interpreted and responded 
to, the findings contribute to a more general level of understanding of the interpretive 
practices and organizational sensemaking involved in risk management (e.g. Weick, 
1995a). These theoretical insights into the practical nature of organizational risk 
management may be productively transferred to other risk management settings and 
help explain practice there. That transferability is, again, an empirical question. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Studying risk management in IRIS demonstrates how distinct and complex practices 
of risk management can emerge in organizations. An increasing number of 
organizations use IRIS as a way of accessing risk data that would not otherwise be 
easily accessible—data arising from the minor mishaps and errors that are a normal 
part of organizational life. The beliefs, assumptions and tactics that supported   20 
practices of risk management here suggest alternatives to the widely instituted 
predictive methods of risk analysis that focus on calculating and ranking risks 
according to the probability of future adverse impacts. Instead, practice here was 
found to be based on attempts to diagnose and respond to deficiencies in current 
organizational capacities for resilience.  
 
In practice, risk was defined and handled in ways that either extended or were 
entirely at odds with current normative designs for risk management. Risk was both 
about the limits of knowledge and control in organizations, and risk management was 
a process focused on identifying these limits and deploying resources to address 
them. This extends our view of organizational risk management by broadening our 
definition of risk. In formal models and guidelines, risk is equated directly with 
future adverse consequences. In this study of practice, averting future adverse 
outcomes defined the aim and ends of risk management, but not the means. Risks 
were identified, assessed and managed in terms of a range of broader criteria and 
considerations. Risk assessment was focused on the capacity for underlying 
organizational processes to provide resilience and control in the face of error, by 
considering the quality and performance of sociotechnical work practices. Risk 
identification was concerned with flagging up areas of uncertainty and ambiguity in 
current models of the organization, and in current work practices. Risk resolution 
was effected by organizing participative investigation, action and change around 
these uncertainties in models and practices. As such, the main concerns were to 
generate new knowledge, revise old knowledge and reshape practice in light of this. 
In combination, these practices demonstrate risk management to be a more 
interactive and active process of examining the minutiae of operational practice, 
actively reflecting on current knowledge, engaging with specialists and experts, and 
facilitating organization-wide processes of enquiry, reflection, learning and change.  
 
This paper therefore presents a first step towards characterizing the practices that 
underlie the core risk management tasks of risk identification, risk assessment and 
risk resolution in organizations. Lifting the lid on the work of risk management in 
this way reveals the complex, multifaceted, subtle and sometimes surprising 
practices that can support this increasingly important organizational function.   21 
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